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Abstract
Artificial creatures form an increasingly important component of interactive computer games. Examples of
such creatures exist which can interact with each other and the game player and learn from their experiences.
However, we argue, the design of the underlying architecture and algorithms has to a large extent overlooked
knowledge from psychology and cognitive sciences. We explore the integration of observations from studies of
motivational systems and emotional behaviour into the design of artificial creatures. An initial implementation
of our ideas using the “sim agent” toolkit illustrates that physiological models can be used as the basis for
creatures with animal like behaviour attributes. The current aim of this research is to increase the “realism” of
artificial creatures in interactive game-play, but it may have wider implications for the development of AI.
1 Introduction
Over the last few decades Artificial Intelligence (AI) has
become more than a philosophical consideration or sci-
ence fiction plot device. With hardware advances it has
become possible to incorporate more powerful AI into
games as well as increasingly complex graphics and en-
vironments. A recent poll of developers showed a sev-
enfold increase in CPU time used for AI in the average
game since 1997 (Johnson, 2002). A large proportion
of this interest in AI is in improving the behaviour of
NPCs (non-player characters), making them more believ-
able and engaging. It is important to stress the difference
between this ‘character-based’ AI and that in strategic or
turn-based games. Isla and Blumberg (2002) elucidate
this in a recent paper:
“These latter categories might be considered attempts
to codify and emulate high-level logical human thinking.
Character-based AI, on the other hand, is an exercise in
creating complete brains. Strategic and logical thinking
in this type of work usually takes a back seat to issues of
low-level perception, reactive behaviour and motor con-
trol....work is often rendered with an eye towards recre-
ating life-like behaviour, and emotion modelling and ro-
bustness are often also central issues.” (2002, p.1)
Essentially ‘character-based’ AI is a move away from
programming an artificial opponent capable of playing
against the human mind in intellectual or strategic games
such as chess. Rather than refining specific high-level log-
ical thinking, the aim is to capture life-like behaviour and
move towards modelling a complete mind. Thus it aims
to populate the game environment with agents who act in
a realistic and capable manner. Enemy ‘bots’ in games
such as “Quake” or “Half-life” do not need to understand
chess or engage in complex reasoning, but they do need
to navigate their environment and know when to attack
the player. These virtual ‘creatures’ should be able to per-
ceive and learn about the environment on their own, make
decisions, and in some instances interact with other ‘crea-
tures’ in a limited way.
The applications for this type of AI are becoming in-
creasingly popular in commercial games, and fairly so-
phisticated designs are emerging. For example Peter
Molyneux’s game ‘Black and White’ included creatures
with impressive learning and the potential to develop in-
teresting ‘personalities’ depending on how the player in-
teracted with them. ‘Bots’ in games such as the “Quake”
series need to navigate a 3D environment realistically as
well as try to kill the player without being shot in the pro-
cess. In later incarnations of similar games, for exam-
ple “Return to Castle Wolfenstein”, the bots also interact
with each other and can develop limited team-based plans.
However at present knowledge from psychology and cog-
nitive sciences about the processes of the mind appears to
a large extent to be under used or overlooked in the design
of game AI.
This is clearly an interesting area not just in terms
of making better games, but in the development of new
AI techniques and algorithms. Laird (2002) argues that
computer games provide challenging environments and
offer many isolated research problems. As the worlds
become more realistic, so too must the behaviour from
their characters become more complex. Psychologists, in
particular those who have worked on animal cognition,
have been studying and detailing the behaviours of au-
tonomous creatures in complex environments far longer
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than AI researchers have been attempting to model them.
Yet many designers of ‘virtual creatures’ seem unaware of
recent developments in psychology and how these might
be applied. Emotion provides a good example of one such
area of research.
Laird mentions that “emotion may be critical to cre-
ating the illusion of human behaviour”, but seems at a
loss how to go about incorporating this - “Unfortunately,
there are no comprehensive computational models of how
emotions impact with behaviour. What are the triggers for
anger? How does anger impact other behaviours?” (Laird
(2002), p.4).
Isla and Blumberg (2002) also discuss the modelling
of emotions in character-based AI. They point out that
much of the work done so far uses emotion as a “di-
agnostic channel”; a convenient indicator which can be
routed from an internal “emotion” value straight to a
facial-expression or visual animation. This value is usu-
ally derived from a series of expressions to calculate how
‘happy’, ‘sad’ or ‘angry’ the character is feeling. Isla &
Blumberg assert that “emotions clearly play a far larger
role in our behaviour ... (they) influence the way that we
make decisions, the way we think about and plan for the
future and even the way we perceive the world” (2002, p.
4). The general approach of Blumberg and other mem-
bers of the MIT ‘synthetic character research group’ is
that Game AI should be inspired by work from animal
learning and psychology. For example they discuss how
the Pavlovian conditioning paradigm can be used, and the
importance of the character being able to form predic-
tions about the world. With regard to emotions, they dis-
cuss their possible application in “action-selection func-
tions”, and making exploratory decisions through a “cu-
riosity emotion”. However, they make no reference in this
case to work done in psychology.
Emotion is certainly very subjective and personal, and
at first seems quite inaccessible to the manipulations and
measurements of science. However psychologists have
been theorising about emotion for over a century. Since
William James first tried to define emotion in his 1884
thesis, research has been done to investigate what emo-
tion is, and more importantly if and how it interacts with
the rest of our cognitive system. James himself contended
that emotions were nothing more than the feelings which
accompany bodily responses to a stimuli. Recent work in
cognitive neuroscience provides evidence to the contrary:
emotions are linked to brain function, to the point that
neural systems of emotion and other mental behaviour are
interdependent (Gazzaniga, Ivry and Mangun, 2002). The
implications of these results are now finding interest in
current work in AI. In this work it is important to focus
away from the subjective, conscious ‘feelings’ of emo-
tion and study the underlying systems which give rise to
them and their impact on behaviour. Generally, it seems
that these systems are heavily involved in reactive mech-
anisms and learning, and possibly also decision making
and attention.
This paper describes our work towards the develop-
ment of a basic agent architecture which incorporates mo-
tivational and emotional elements derived using ideas and
findings from psychology to inform the design. In partic-
ular this aims to incorporate some emotional mechanisms
that have a deep effect on the decision making process.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows:
Section 2 reviews literature on the psychology of ani-
mal motivation, Section 3 outlines work from current de-
velopments in artificial intelligence, Section 4 describes
our working environment, Section 5 introduces the archi-
tecture of our artificial creature agents, Section 6 gives
some initial results and finally Section 7 draws conclu-
sions from our current study and considers how the work
might be extended.
2 Animal Motivation Theories
In this section we explore some key observations from
animal motivation theories and their implications for the
design of our model for an artificial creature.
2.1 Miller’s equilibrium model and the
approach-avoid conflict
Generally speaking, animals react to signals they receive
from environmental stimuli. Depending on the nature
of the stimulus itself and knowledge of past experience
with this type of object, the animal will either approach
or avoid it. An approach-avoidance conflict occurs when
these signals impel an animal towards these two incom-
patible forms of action.
Gray (1987) notes that conflict of this kind is extremely
common. For animals, it is particularly apparent in their
behaviour towards a novel object. Novelty is an important
stimulus for both eliciting fear (avoidance) and encourag-
ing exploration (approach). In general, animals appear
to avoid extremely novel stimuli, but be attracted to ones
which are mildly novel.
Experimental psychologist Neal Miller performed a se-
ries of studies on the approach-avoid behaviour of rats.
The resulting findings allowed him to develop a model
which incorporates the various factors involved.
In Miller’s basic experimental situation, a rat is trained
to run down an alley to get a food reward. However, every
time it reaches the goal, it receives a shock. This sets up
a conflict situation. Miller observed that the rat ended up
oscillating round an equilibrium ‘stopping point’ a certain
distance from the goalbox. The distance of this point from
the goal is defined by the strength of the tendencies to
approach and avoid the food. The diagram below shows
the factors that affect these tendencies and the resulting
decision. Miller’s model is represented in Figure 1.
Note that the factors include both internal states of the
rat as well as external information from the environment
and previous experience. Increasing the hunger or de-
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Figure 1: Miller’s equilibrium model. (Adapted from
Gray (1987), p.142.)
creasing the shock intensity will in turn affect the ap-
proach/stop tendencies, and move the equilibrium point
closer to the goal. If the approach tendency is much larger
than the stop one, you would expect the rat to actually
reach the food.
Another point is that ‘distance to the goal’ is a criti-
cal factor in both ‘approach’ and ‘stop’ tendencies. How-
ever distance cannot affect them in an identical manner:
if this was the case then whichever was stronger at the
start point would be stronger at the end, resulting in a be-
haviour where the animal either stops as far as possible
from the goal, or completely approaches it.
Work in Miller’s (1951, 1959 as cited in Gray 1987)
laboratory demonstrated that the strength of the avoidance
tendency increases more rapidly with nearness to the goal
than that of approach.
Miller noted that there are two main forces behind the
tendencies: those that are internal to the animal (such as
hunger or other ‘drives’), and those relating to the envi-
ronment and the stimulus itself. They pointed out that
there are no internal sources of motivation for the avoid-
ance tendency, and hence it is more purely dependent on
environmental factors than the approach tendency. This
helps explain why distance has a greater effect on the
avoid tendency, especially when near to the goal.
It is clear then that the action towards a certain object is
not clear-cut. It is not a simple case of approaching food
and avoiding negative objects. Where an animal has learnt
to associate pain with an otherwise positive stimulus it
may avoid it; conversely if it is hungry enough it will still
approach food even if this means receiving a shock.
In terms of programming design, this means that it is
wrong to divide the world up into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ ob-
jects. Instead, every object has the potential to be an over-
all positive-approach stimulus or a negative-avoid one. It
depends not just on the properties of the object, but also
what it is associated with and the current internal condi-
tion of the animal. This notion of approach-avoid con-
flicts forms the core of our system design.
2.2 Motivation systems
It is difficult to find one all-inclusive definition of motiva-
tion, instead there are various different features which are
important to consider.
Firstly, a motivated action differs from a reflex because
it is not simply a reaction to an external stimulus. It is
also in someway ‘driven’ by internal states. Teitelbaum
(1977, as cited in Toates 1986) argues that “To infer moti-
vation we must break the fixed reflex connection between
stimulus and response.” Teitelbaum feels that motivation
is always directed towards obtaining a certain goal.
Epstein (1982, as cited in Toates 1986) also argues that
motivations are complex properties that arise from both
external and internal factors. He also considers a third
factor: what the animal remembers from past encounters
with an incentive object, and the consequence of this en-
counter.
There are a variety of different models of motivation, of
which the simplest is a homeostatic model. Essentially, a
homeostatic model is about maintaining essential param-
eters (e.g. energy level, fluid level) at a near constant ‘nor-
mal’ level. If there is a disturbance then corrective action
is taken. Homeostatic mechanisms are driven by ‘neg-
ative feedback’, which can ‘switch off’ motivation once
the deficit has been recovered. The homeostatic model is
represented in Figure 2.
According to Grossman (1967, as cited in Toates 1986),
there are two types of motivation systems: one which is
homeostatic and includes hunger, thirst and other internal
factors, while the other is only driven by external factors
and includes sex, exploration and aggression.
This dichotomy, however, is too simple, and models
developed later do not separate out motivations into these
two different types. Homeostatic mechanisms may play a
part in explaining the negative-feedback aspects of hunger
and thirst, but by themselves are not sufficient as a model.
There are other factors to take account of, such as the
availability or ‘cost’ of food - when access to food is made
difficult and more energetically costly, animals eat less
Toates (1986).
Homeostatic models which look at correcting an en-
ergy depletion also do not explain why animals (or indeed
people) will overeat if provided with sweet or tasty foods.
A final problem is that they do not adequately explain how
having a water deficit can then steer an animal towards a
water-related goal: in other words they miss the link be-
tween the internal state of the animal, and acting towards
the external incentives available.
In Bindra’s theory (1976, 1978, as cited in Toates
1986), the emphasis is on the role of ‘incentive stimuli’
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Figure 2: Homeostatic model of motivation. (Adapted from Toates (1986), p.37.)
as well as internal states in the motivation of behaviour.
An incentive stimulus is an object or event judged as ‘he-
donically potent’ - one which is affectively positive or
negative. This is similar to Miller’s approach/avoid ten-
dencies; an animal will react in an appetitive way to he-
donically positive incentives, and in an aversive way to
negative ones.
Whether a stimulus is seen as hedonically potent de-
pends on various factors, including previous experience
with that stimulus as well as physiological states. An ani-
mal may assimilate information about a stimulus which it
sees as ‘neutral’; later on, if the physiological state of the
animal changes, that same object could become a positive
incentive. For example, an item of food may appear as
neutral while the animal is satiated, but once it becomes
hungrier that same piece of food becomes a positive in-
centive which elicits an appetitive reaction.
Bindra develops these ideas into a concept of a ‘cen-
tral motivational state’ (c.m.s), which he defines as “a
hypothetical set of neural processes that promotes goal-
directed actions in relation of particular classes of incen-
tive stimuli” (Bindra, 1974 as cited in Toates 1986).
Figure 3: Bindra’s model of motivation. The food acts
as an incentive stimuli in the feeding motivation system.
(Adapted from Toates (1986), p. 43.)
A c.m.s arises from an interaction of ‘organismic
states’ (e.g energy level, testosterone) and the presence
of incentive stimuli, see Figure 3. If there are no relevant
stimuli present, for example no food when the animal is
hungry, then a depletion of energy will not cause system-
atic goal-directed behaviour. Instead, an increase in gen-
eral activity may be observed. Also, Toates (1986) notes
that novel hedonically neutral stimuli may still arouse
some exploration.
In contrast to the homeostatic model, where the internal
state drives behaviour, the existence of an incentive stim-
ulus is key. In feeding c.m.s, energy depletion only serves
to accentuate the food representation. This explains why
tasty and palatable food is sufficient to motivate consuma-
tory behaviour without any kind of energy deprivation.
Thus we can conclude that a homeostatic model is too
simplistic for understanding how animals are motivated.
All the theories outlined here emphasise a complex inter-
play between the internal states of the animals with the
properties of objects in their external environment. In
Bindra’s model, an animal cannot just feel motivated to
eat because its energy level is depleted - it is only moti-
vated to act in the presence of hedonically potent stimuli.
These ideas counter the notion than an animal, once at a
certain ‘level’ of hunger, then sticks rigidly to an explicit
goal of ‘find food’ until its hunger is reduced.
Thus our system needs to include a motivation system
which is more flexible than is perhaps usual in existing
artificial creatures. The motivation system is a key aspect
in that it affects the decision of how the creature should
act at each turn in a game.
2.2.1 Toates System theory model of motivation
Figure 4: Toates’ system theory model. K1 represents the
energy ‘gain’ of the system, which determines the level
and type of motivation. (Adapted from Toates (1986),
p.49.)
Toates (1986) describes his own ‘systems theory’
model which draws together ideas on motivation similar
to Bindra’s work. Toates’ model is shown in Figure 4.
This type of model makes a good bridge from psycho-
logical models to computation ones. Toates’ model takes
account of the three important factors:
• the need for a sensory stimulus to arouse a motivated
response.
• the role of the energy level or internal states of the
animal in adjusting the ‘sensitivity’ of the system.
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• information from past experiences.
K1 represents the ‘gain’ or sensitivity of the nervous
system, and subsequent motivation. If the sensory stimu-
lus ‘revives’ negative memories of a past experience with
this object, it will reduce the value of K1. If K1 drops
to negative numbers this will result in an active avoidance
response at the motivation level.
The K1 parameter in Toates’ model provides a conve-
nient mechanism to encapsulate all the factors involved in
motivation in a single number, making the programming
of subsequent processes neater. However, it seems likely
that there is more to animal motivation systems than de-
scribed by Toates. Specifically, there is probably a role
for emotions, such as fear or pleasure, in motivation and
related decision making.
2.3 Emotions
In game AI where emotions have appeared at all, it is gen-
erally at a cosmetic level - giving the character the ap-
pearance of showing a certain emotion. Here we are con-
cerned not with the subjective feeling or visual appear-
ance of emotions, but rather the underlying mechanisms
which give rise to these states.
In this section we review three examples from neuro-
science and animal behaviour providing emotional mech-
anisms that could play a part in the motivation system of
our artificial creatures.
2.3.1 Neuroscience and Fear Conditioning
Joseph LeDoux (LeDoux, 1999) identifies two neural
routes - one cortical and one subcortical - involved in
emotional learning (such as that involved in fear condi-
tioning). The amygdala is a major part of the subcortical
route, and removing it prevents fear conditioning from oc-
curring at all. LeDoux suggests that the role of this sub-
cortical route is as a quick-and-dirty reaction mechanism;
emotional responses such as fear begin in the amygdala
before we even recognise completely what it is we are re-
acting to.
LeDoux maintains that “Emotion is not just uncon-
scious memory: it exerts a powerful influence on declara-
tive memory and other thought processes.” According to
Antonio Damasio, one such thought process is that of de-
cision making. He argues that the idea of a totally rational
decision maker is not appropriate when quick decisions
must be made, and affective memories are invaluable in
these cases (Damasio, 1994).
Damasio proposes a “somatic marker hypothesis”
which suggests that certain structures in the prefrontal
cortex create associations between somatic responses trig-
gered by the amygdala and complex stimuli processed in
the cortex. The idea is that both positive and negative as-
sociations can be created. Somatic markers help limit the
number of possibilities to sort through when making a de-
cision by directing the person away from those associated
with negative feelings.
These ideas suggest that not only do affective associ-
ations play a part in decision-making, but that there is a
physically different route in the brain which processes ba-
sic emotional information. In terms of the design of an ar-
tificial creature, it would seem sensible to have a similar
route, whereby fearful reactions can override more com-
plex processing and steer the animal away from danger.
How do these findings relate to the design of synthetic
characters? Firstly, as asserted by LeDoux, whilst con-
sciousness is needed for the subjective feeling of emotion,
the basic function of emotional processing and response
can be found even in a fruit fly. Thus it seems a possi-
ble and useful task to incorporate emotional learning into
an AI agent in some way. Since fear conditioning has
been extensively studied, it would seem to make a good
choice as a place to start. Damasio’s hypothesis of ‘so-
matic markers’ suggests ways that emotion is important in
decision making as well as aspects of learning. It would
be interesting to see if basing algorithms around his hy-
pothesis could make for a more ‘emotional agent’; one
that makes more than completely rational, logical deci-
sions as is generally the case in current game AI. Could
this make for a more believable character?
2.3.2 Learning
Toates (1986) notes that when it comes to motivation sys-
tems, animals respond to ‘primary incentives’ (such as
food) and ‘cues predictive of primary incentives’. In fear-
conditioning, animals learn to associate a particular stim-
ulus (e.g. the sound of a bell) with an aversive stimulus
such as shock. Once this has occurred, the initial stimulus
alone is enough to rouse the animal into a state of fear.
In this way, fear plays a role in animal learning. If a
stimulus puts the animal in a state of fear, then its aver-
sive reaction to a subsequent powerful or noisy stimulus
is enhanced Toates (1986).
Combined with Damasio’s theory, this means that any
stimuli occurring while the animal is in a state of fear
will be associated more strongly with a negative somatic
marker. To replicate this idea, the design of an AI archi-
tecture could include a process whereby being in a state of
fear affects the strength and type of associations formed
by the program.
An advantage of reacting fearfully to cues which pre-
dict pain is that the animal will take an appropriate avoid-
ance response before the pain actually occurs.
Gray (1987) explains that rats respond differently in
two conditions - receiving a shock, and being exposed to a
stimulus that they have learnt predicts a shock occurring.
In the first condition, there is a great increase in activ-
ity, frantic scampering, or attacking some feature of the
environment. In contrast, encountering a stimuli which
predicts shock results in the rat freezing. Gray suggests
this is an adaptive response that occurs when a rat spots
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a predator - it freezes in an attempt to avoid detection.
He also adds that the response is affected by distance - if
the stimulus (or predator) gets too close, the rat shows a
strong aversive reaction.
By incorporating fear appropriately into learning and
decision mechanisms, an approach to AI could be devel-
oped that responds pre-emptively rather than just reac-
tively to pain. Also, the priming effect of fear on forming
associations may result in a program which learns to avoid
painful situations more efficiently than one with no fear.
2.3.3 The Role of Pleasure
Emotions can also impact animal behaviour to support
positive behaviour. For example, there is the concept of a
‘positive feedback’ priming mechanism that helps to sus-
tain certain activities. Evidence for this was found by Mc-
Farland and McFarland (1968, in (Toates, 1986)). They
noticed that interrupting doves while they were drink-
ing caused them to ‘lose momentum’. This implies that
there was something about drinking itself that increased
the motivational state of the dove. Toates (1986, p. 116)
explains that an animal needs such a positive feedback ef-
fect, particularly in situations where simultaneous feeding
and drinking tendencies exist of almost identical strength.
If it decides to eat and only negative feedback exists, then
after the first couple of mouthfuls the feeding motivation
will drop, in turn making the drinking tendency stronger.
The animal would end up oscillating between food and
water, which is costly in terms of time and energy. It
would be more advantageous to stick with one activity
for a longer period of time before switching.
It would seem vital to have some kind of positive feed-
back mechanism to reduce the chance of the AI oscil-
lating, and hence to look more believable as well as be-
ing more efficient. While the animal motivation literature
does not discuss pleasure as such, this concept makes at
least a good metaphor for the ‘positive feedback’ concept.
It would make sense that the animal would feel something
good when it starts eating or drinking. Essentially, plea-
sure can be thought of as a reward from an internal, rather
than external, origin. Finally, in the same way that the fear
emotion might enhance learning about dangerous objects,
it would seem a good idea to have a similar ‘emotion’
which affects the learning about really positive objects or
encounters.
3 Artificial Intelligence
In order to make use of the ideas from the previous sec-
tion, we need to consider what sort of design and frame-
work would be conducive to the incorporation of emo-
tional processes. Despite the lack of sophisticated emo-
tional agents in modern computer games, emotions in
general are not a new topic for AI. For example, Si-
mon (1967) had already explored the need to account for
‘alarm mechanisms’ in artificial systems.
Since the 1980s, many different programs have been
specified and sometimes implemented. One of the most
notable examples in this area is the work of Sloman (Slo-
man, 1999)(Sloman, 2000) (Sloman, 2001). He argues for
more sophisticated theories of affect and emotion, and has
suggested an architecture-based approach to the design of
affective agents. This means starting with specifications
of architectures for complete agents, and then finding out
what sorts of states and processes are supported by those
architectures. Sloman himself specifies a multi-level ‘Co-
gAff Architecture Schema’ (Sloman, 2001) in which ‘af-
fective’ states and processes “can be defined in terms of
the various types of information processing and control
states supported by different variants of the architecture,
in which different subsets of the architecture are present.”
It interesting to note that Sloman has severe objections
to Damasio’s hypothesis and does not believe that “emo-
tions somehow contribute to intelligence: rather they are a
side-effect of mechanisms that are required for other rea-
sons.” Despite the debate over emotions and intelligence,
Sloman’s work is still consistent with that of LeDoux and
neuroscience in general. For example, the ‘reactive layer’
in his architecture which monitors automatic responses is
similar to the direct activation of the amygdala from the
sensory thalamus e.g in fear conditioning. His ‘delibera-
tive’, reasoning layer is equivalent to the slower reasoning
performed in the cortex. The ‘meta management’ layer,
for monitoring internal states and processes is a little more
tricky to pinpoint, however LeDoux (1999) identifies neu-
ral systems which may support the awareness of the activ-
ity of bodily responses.
Work done by Moffat (2001) ‘on the positive value of
affect’ also draws on psychology to improve AI perfor-
mance, and provides more inspiration for the relevance of
emotion. Moffat feels that cognitive psychologists tend to
focus on the function of negative emotions (such as fear),
but positive emotions are also important, particularly in
learning. On the other hand, machine ‘learning classi-
fier systems’ (LCSs) model reward and not punishment.
‘EMMA’, the model resulting from attempts to combine
positive and negative affect, was found to learn certain be-
haviours better than the LCSs. More importantly, Moffat
found that the ‘emotions’ provided a way of signifying
importance to EMMA:
“LCSs do not distinguish between stimuli of varying
priorities.... EMMA devotes her attention and all her re-
sources to the most important aspect of her current sit-
uation. In this respect, emotion is a kind of biological
optimiser that could be put to good use in artificial agents
too; especially learning ones” (Moffat, 2001), p.61.
Moffat’s work suggests the importance of incorporat-
ing negative and positive affect. Our work adopts an
archictecture-based model as advocated by Sloman. This
means rather than trying to code specific behaviours and
abilities as they are needed, the starting point is to spec-
ify an architecture for a complete agent, and investigate
which processes are supported by that architecture.
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4 Agent and Game Design
In this section we outline the “sim agent” toolkit used to
implement our prototype agent system, and the design of
a simple game framework to explore agent behaviour.
4.1 Programming Environment
The “sim agent” toolkit developed by the ‘Cognition and
Affect project’ at University of Birmingham, is designed
with the specific intention of enabling the building of
agent architectures1. It runs using the Pop-11 language
within the POPLOG environment, on both Linux and
Windows systems. Sim agent was chosen for our work
since it allows a wide range of programming techniques,
and for the possibility of hybrid systems, for example in-
corporating neural networks.
Figure 5: For each ‘time-slice’, the sim agent Scheduler
runs through processes for each agent. After this is com-
plete, the Scheduler executes any actions, such as moving
the agents to a new location, and updates the graphics ac-
cordingly.
Figure 5 shows the operation of the sim agent toolkit.
Time is simulated in discrete ‘time-slices’, which effec-
tively act as a counter. This means that time is not truly
continuous, and that the agents all act in a synchronous
way. During each time slice, the agent does the follow-
ing:
• New sensory data is added to the agent’s personal
database.
• Next, its rulesystem runs, acting on the information
available in the agent’s database. Unless the agent
is going to do nothing during this time-slice, the
rulesystem will output one or more ‘do X’ items into
the agent’s database.
1Details available from: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/
˜axs/cog\_affect/sim\_agent.html
• The scheduler moves on to any other agents or ob-
jects that exist in the environment, and repeats the
procedure. When this is finished, it goes back and
‘picks up’ all the ‘do’ actions, and executes them.
4.2 Game Design
A simple game was designed to explore our approach
to programming artificial creatures for computer games.
This incorporates a set of ‘Rat’ agents, two sets of ‘Rat’
agents were designed, one with ‘emotional mechanisms’
involving fear and pleasure, and the other without. The
aim then is to ask participants to play two different ver-
sions of the game, taking objective measures of the Rat’s
performance and a subjective measure of which version
the participant thought was more believable.
Figure 6: Concept diagram showing typical graphics for
the game.
Rats will be implemented in sim agent, and consist of
a ‘hunger level’, ‘thirst level’, ‘speed’, and a ‘heading’
(direction). The Rat also has a value expressing its current
emotional state (fear, pleasure or neutral), and a flag for
being in pain or not. ‘Food’, ‘water’ and ‘person’ are all
created as objects, of which the game player can move
only the food and person.
The idea of the game from the player’s point of view
is to score points by shocking Rat agents. It uses a turn-
based system, whereby the Rats all make an action choice
and move, then the player takes a turn.
The aim of the Rats is to basically stay alive, by keep-
ing their hunger and thirst levels relatively low. They have
a simple learning system whereby they can form associa-
tions between objects which occur together in space, and
events that occur together in time. They start off know-
ing nothing about the player. In other words they have
no ‘instinctive fear’. Also, the Rats do not immediately
understand that a received shock is related to the person -
this is something they should learn to associate over time.
Shocking a Rat puts it into a state of pain. In Rat agents
with emotions, it also puts them into a state of fear. Both
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these affect the processing of the Rat during its subse-
quent turn.
Each turn, the player can move the person within a cer-
tain distance, then has the option to shock up to one Rat,
if that Rat is ‘in range’ of the shocking device which the
person carries. The Rat cannot discern the direction that
the shock came from; instead it decides which object is
the most likely ‘cause’ of the pain, based upon the asso-
ciations stored in its memory. Note that the range of the
shocking device is greater than the visual range of the Rat.
This means it is possible to shock the Rat without it seeing
the person at all. If the Rat cannot decide where the shock
came from it will react differently; perhaps running in a
random direction as opposed to freezing or actively avoid-
ing the object it links with causing pain. We hope that this
feature will make the Rat appear more believable.
The player also has the option of moving one piece of
food around, within a certain distance. This ensures not
only a more dynamic environment, but opens up a few
more strategies to the player, such as piling all the food
together in one place and standing the person next to it.
Rats that feel fear should learn more quickly that the
person is associated with pain. This is because being in a
state of fear enhances the memory updating and associa-
tions involved with pain and objects that might be causing
it. Secondly, it is possible for Rats to feel fear at certain
objects before they are actually in pain. This should help
them pre-empt the shock and hopefully avoid the feared
object before it causes pain.
The role of the pleasure emotion is slightly more sub-
tle. It occurs when the Rat starts eating or drinking; to
a greater extent the more hungry or thirsty it is. It pro-
vides a positive feedback mechanism, which will encour-
age the Rat to continue consuming until its hunger/thirst
level drops quite low. This aim here is to prevent the Rat
from ‘oscillating’ between food and water objects if its
hunger and thirst levels are at similar values.
Both emotions are continuous, occurring at certain lev-
els rather than being simply on or off. This allows
for some more complex possibilities, such as a situation
where the Rat feels a little bit fearful but very hungry; so
it approaches the food despite being slightly afraid of it.
While we have a complete design of the architecture for
the game, its implementation is incomplete. The system
currently does not incorporate interaction with a user, and
the memory and emotion systems are not yet functional.
5 Architecture Overview
5.1 Basic Framework
Figure 7 shows the architecture of the Rat agent. The cur-
rently implemented basic design is shaded grey. This in-
cludes the core decision-making aspect, and the motiva-
tion systems. Running from top to the bottom is roughly
equivalent to the order of the sim agent rulesystem run by
each agent during the cycle.
Perceptual system This identifies what the object is,
along with other properties such as how far away it is,
how much there is, and in the case of food/drink a ‘he-
donic’ value representing how ‘tasty’ or desirable it is.
Any information about objects recognised as food will be
passed on to the feeding motivation system, and the de-
tails of drink objects filtered to the drinking motivation
system. At this stage any other objects, such as Rats or
perhaps the human player are not processed further.
Motivation systems Here a value for each object is cal-
culated. The value represents an overall ‘weight’ of im-
portance. It takes account of the properties of the individ-
ual item, and how far away it is, along with specific infor-
mation on the internal condition of the Rat. The Feeding
motivation system uses the Rat’s hunger value, while the
drinking systems uses the thirst value. (Hunger does not
affect the drinking motivation system.) An equation for
this is as follows:
Weight = a× Hunger + b× Amount
c× Distance
+ d× Hedonic Value
A weight value is computed for each object, along with an
appropriate action. If the weight value is positive, then the
action will be to approach the object; if it is negative then
the suggestion will be to move away from it (particularly
unpleasant food i.e. with a large negative hedonic value,
might be aversive). If the Rat is currently consuming the
object, the weight will represent how important it is to
carry on doing so.
Finally, if there are no food objects going into the
feeding system, it will output an ‘explore’ action, with
a weight evaluated using the Rat’s current hunger level as
the main variable.
Decision The decision mechanism simply chooses
whichever action has the highest ‘weight’ associated with
it. However, it could be more complex than this - taking
account of what other objects lie in the same direction. So
a good decision might be to go towards a mediocre item of
food if there also happens to be some water nearby. Con-
versely, if a great item of food is very close to a dangerous
object it might be better to avoid that direction.
Motor system The processes here figure out how far
the Rat can move in the chosen direction, and evaluates
the new co-ordinates to be put out as a movement action.
5.2 Full Version
The Full Architecture design shown in Figure 7 includes
two important additions to the basic version: memory and
emotion systems.
Memory This stores locations of objects which the Rat
encounters, and includes a simple learning mechanism
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Figure 7: Rat Agent architecture design. The implemented base design is shaded grey.
which can develop conditional associations between ob-
jects and events which occur together in space or time, in
additional to unconditional ones arising from the uncon-
ditional stimulus of the object. It provides extra detail to
the motivation systems, so their evaluation equation can
also take account of any past experience with the object.
The object memory does not remember food items as
‘specific’ e.g ‘food item one’, but instead stores food by
location e.g ‘food at (x,y)’.
Emotion This does several things, but all the actions
essentially involve fear and pleasure. Firstly, it cross ref-
erences incoming visual information with details in the
memory to see if any objects should elicit a state of fear,
and if so then what level of fear. The level relates directly
to the strength of the association between that object and
being in pain.
In terms of pleasure, at the moment it only produces
this state if the Rat is actually consuming, however this
could be extended to an anticipative pleasure. The level
of pleasure is determined by how hungry the Rat is. So
if it is really hungry before it starts eating, the level of
pleasure will be high. In a sense ‘pleasure’ here can also
be thought of as ‘relief’.
The emotion system can adjust the weight values pro-
duced by the motivation systems to enhance or reduce
particular signals. As an example, if one of the food ob-
jects is associated with something nasty the feeding mo-
tivation system may output a negative ‘avoid’ signal for
that object. If it is particularly nasty - enough to cause
some degree of fear - the emotion system will enhance
the signal, making it particularly aversive, while decreas-
ing the strength of all the other signals.
It is important to note that in this situation the emo-
tion system does not necessarily get the last word - if the
rat is especially thirsty, one of the ‘approach water ob-
ject’ signals might still be greater than the avoidance one.
However, if recognising an object pushes fear above a cer-
tain threshold, an override happens; the rat will run from
that object despite how hungry or thirsty it might be. This
route is approximately similar to the ‘quick and dirty’ fear
reaction mechanism discussed by neuroscientists.
If the Rat is feeling pleasure at consuming an object,
the emotion system will also adjust the weights, increas-
ing the consume signal while decreasing the others. The
amount that the signals are altered will relate directly to
the level of emotion - a higher level resulting in a greater
signal adjustment.
Feeling either emotion to any level will also feed back
into the memory system, enhancing specific associations
formed or reinforced during that cycle. In particular
if the Rat was in a state of fear because it could see
the player, and then subsequently experienced a painful
shock, the association between the player and pain would
be strengthened to a greater level than if the Rat was in a
neutral emotional condition.
5.3 System Implementation Details
While it is often comparatively easy to specify the de-
sired features and behaviour of a system, actually encod-
ing these into a working agent is often much more diffi-
17
cult. In this section we discuss our current implementa-
tion of the systems within the Rat and how these might be
extended.
5.3.1 Hunger/Thirst Systems
After some consideration the following relationship was
used to calculate the hunger and thirst values in each cy-
cle.
Y =
2x− 1
(2x− 1)2 + 1
+ 0.5
where Y is the new Hunger or Thirst value and x repre-
sents a counter which increments each cycle. It is a fairly
arbitary choice, and could be replaced with an equation
(or indeed series of equations) which more accurately re-
flect how hunger changes in a real animal.
This function was chosen since it increases slowly, in-
dicating that the Rat’s hunger/thirst level rises slowly at
first, but then increases rapidly to a point where it is ‘very
hungry’, with the limiting value Y = 1.0 leading to death
of the Rat from starvation. This function is not taken from
any particular animal psychology literature, but is based
on intuition of the relationship between hunger/thirst and
time. During each run of the Rat agent the hunger and
thirst levels are updated.
It would be good if food of a higher ‘quality’ actually
reduced their hunger by more - in other words there would
be some real benefit in going for these type of objects.
This is one of the many ideas which could relatively easily
be added into the program in the future.
5.3.2 Motivation Systems
The feeding and drinking systems are identical, and we
describe only the feeding system here.
The purpose of the motivation system is to process the
relevant visual information and output a database entry
for each object determining the most appropriate action.
‘Food Weight’ FW is calculated using the following
equation,
Food Weight ∝ H
2
D
+ FQ
where H is the hunger, D is the distance to the food, and
FQ the food quality. The hunger value is squared so that
the resulting weight is exponentially greater at high lev-
els of hunger. FW is proportional to 1/D, resulting in
lower weights with greater distances between the Rat the
the food. Food quality is added to the end to provide a
final adjustment. If it is negative, it may push the result-
ing weight to negative values and a subsequent ‘avoid’
action. The constants in the equation were derived from
trial-and-error testing until the Rats behaved in a reason-
ably balanced way.
At the end of the day, the motivation equation is key
to the decisions made by the Rat, and behaviour may be
further improved by use of alternative functions. Another
option would be to use a genetic algorithm approach to
try to ‘evolve’ an optimal equation that produces the most
‘fit’ Rats. Fitness could be simply a survival rate, or relate
to how well the Rat maintains a balanced level of hunger
and thirst.
5.3.3 Explore System
If there is no visual data on food objects available, the
system outputs an explore action.
The ‘Explore Weight’ EW is calculated using the fol-
lowing method,
EW ∝ need2
where need is the current hunger level of the Rat.
Again, this is another equation that could benefit from
being ‘evolved’ by genetic algorithms. At the moment it
is roughly balanced so as to become more urgent to find
food the hungrier the Rat becomes, but at lower levels
of hunger it’s still better to carry on drinking if drink is
available.
Again the exploratory mechanism is not based on psy-
chological literature, but in its current intuitive form
merely ensures that the Rat moves to locate sources of
food and drink. There is considerable existing work on
animal foraging patterns that could be applied here.
The following exploration method was developed using
trial and error experimentation. The explore action has the
potential to span up to 6 turns, during which the Rat does
the following:
Turn Action Count
1 Choose random direction X, move that way. 1
2 Continue to move in X direction 2
3 Continue to move in X direction 3
4 Reverse direction X, move that way 4
5 Continue to move in (reversed) X direction 5
6 Continue to move in (reversed) X direction 6
7 Back in starting position, choose direction Y 1
This means that the Rat spends 3 turns moving in one
direction, at which point it turns round and goes back to
the starting position. If in any of these turns it encoun-
ters food/drink then it reacts to those objects: in other
words it is not ‘committed’ to completing the exploration
sequence.
When it comes to step 6, a new angle for exploration
is chosen. Essentially the new angle cannot be anywhere
within the range of the old one, plus or minus 45 degrees.
This makes sure that after an unsuccessful exploration in
one direction, the Rat chooses a significantly different di-
rection to explore in next.
6 Results
Figure 8 shows a series of images showing the progress
of Rat agents. The frame number refers to the time-slice
at which the snapshot was taken. The rats are the square
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Figure 8: Images showing an example of Rat agent progress.
boxes in the centre of frame (1). They all start off with
hunger and thirst at the same low level in all of the results
discussed. This is probably why r2 and r3 head towards
the same water object (the square boxes) at the beginning.
At cycle 3 R1 can be seen to be fairly close to both a
food item (the circles) and a water item. The water item
it heads towards has the highest ‘quality’ value of the ob-
jects in the environment, so this move makes sense. After
drinking for a bit, the food motivation system pushes him
to explore (about cycle 12/13). He finds food and con-
sumes this for about 5 cycles then makes his way to the
nearby water object. At this point though he hits a bug
whereby no matter how much he drinks the thirst does
not go down. By cycle 52 he is dead from hunger.
Rats R2 and R3 essentially oscillate between the food
and water objects on the far right.
While the motivation equations could do with some ad-
justing, it is still good to see that the agents make some
attempt to keep their hunger and thirst levels low. Also it
is good to see the inefficient oscillating behaviour occur-
ring as predicted. Including the ‘pleasure emotion’ may
really help to reduce this.
7 Discussion
Although the implementation of the Rat agent architec-
ture is not complete, some conclusions can be drawn at
this stage. The work completed so far is very promising,
and we are confident that developing it further would re-
sult in some very interesting results.
Firstly, there is a wealth of psychology literature which
makes for good source material and inspiration. The work
described here focuses on motivation and emotion sys-
tems. However, there is much more information and the-
ory available than has been incorporated in this design.
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Many of the ideas described in this literature are not ones
that are typically explored when considering problems
purely from an AI point of view.
The biggest advantage of considering animal motiva-
tion studies is that the researchers spent a lot of time ob-
serving and testing the animals, and really getting to grips
with the basic systems that drive and affect behaviour. Re-
gardless of whether their findings accurately explain how
the animal mind really works, their descriptions still relate
strongly to real observable actions. The resulting models
and diagrams make it fairly simple to port the ideas over
to a computing environment.
It is encouraging to see that even the basic version re-
sulted in agents that made appropriate decisions to reduce
their hunger and thirst levels. Their behaviour was al-
ways slightly unpredictable (and hence, perhaps more be-
lievable?) since they never followed a ‘set path’ or ‘set
procedure’. It was not a case of ‘when hunger is X, find
food’.
The architecture-based approach lends itself well to the
approach taken in this work. Once the basic architec-
ture design was in place, other aspects could integrated
in quite a natural way. For example, once the base moti-
vation system was in place, it was fairly straightforward
to see how the fear emotion could be incorporated and
affect the decision making.
In the games industry, it is becoming more common to
use pre-designed ‘engines’ to cover whole aspects of the
coding. These engines tend to be specialised, for example
it is possible to get physics engines that deal specifically
with car crashes. Considering how complex just design-
ing the motivation, or learning, or perceptual system can
be it would seem a good idea to put them together as an
AI creature ‘engine’. This could be the basic all-purpose
agent which could then be tweaked and adapted by the
specific game designers to suit their needs. Using a sys-
tem like sim agent would be perfect for this, since it is
easy to adjust old rulesets, add in new ones, or simply
change the base variables for the agent instance. The ar-
chitecture and design ideas presented here could form a
component of such an engine.
To really achieve this effectively, it may be necessary
to bring together a hybrid of AI techniques. In this in-
vestigation we saw how difficult it is to know what func-
tions to use to provide the most efficient and realistic be-
haviour. This is exactly the type of problem that genetic
algorithms could help with. Neural networks, or at least
a connectionist approach, seem like the best strategy for
implementing learning systems. However, without being
implemented in a way that makes them useable inside the
symbolic environment of game code they are not too prac-
tical. Both these areas would provide good grounds for
further study.
Overall, we are encouraged by our results. They
demonstrate that psychology literature is a very fruitful
resource. If a complete AI engine which has been inspired
by psychology in is developed, we feel that it would in-
deed create more believable agents and much more im-
mersive game play.
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